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Abstract: Commentators have rightly focused on the reasons why Hume maintains that the 
conclusions of skeptical arguments cannot be believed, as well as on the role these 
arguments play in Hume’s justification of his account of the mind. Nevertheless, Hume’s 
interpreters should take more seriously the question of whether Hume holds that these 
arguments are demonstrations. Only if the arguments are demonstrations do they have the 
requisite status to prove Hume’s point—and justify his confidence—about the nature of 
the mind’s belief-generating faculties. In this paper, I treat Hume’s argument against the 
primary/secondary quality distinction as my case study, and I argue that it is intended by 
Hume to be a demonstration of a special variety. 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, I will argue that Hume holds there are demonstrations—sound arguments 
with necessary premises—that have conclusions that cannot be believed. I will also argue that 
Hume maintains that some of these incredible demonstrations have conclusions that cannot be 
known. Thus, it is my contention that Hume holds that we can demonstrate necessary truths that 
are neither knowable nor believable. 
 My case study will be the main argument from section 1.4.4 of Hume's Treatise, which 
concludes that if our perceptions of colors, sounds, tastes, and smells could not be perceptions of 
mind-independent things, then our perceptions of bodies could not be perceptions of mind-





he adapts from Berkeley. Hume asserts that if those of us who believe that only our mental states 
instantiate "sounds, colours, heat, cold, and other sensible qualities" were to believe the conclusion 
of this argument, then they would not believe in the mind-independent existence of bodies. Hume 
is well aware that no one's beliefs are extinguished by this argument. Hume is confident that we 
still believe in the mind-independent existence of bodies after evaluating his argument, regardless 
of our take on it. On my interpretation, this is not because Hume holds that the argument is inferior 
in any way; indeed, as stated above, I will argue that Hume maintains that it is a demonstration, 
and he holds that demonstrations are the gold standard, in that they are sound arguments with 
necessary premises. And it is not because we cannot or do not conceive its premises or conclusion. 
Rather, we cannot believe on the basis of this argument because the faculties of the mind 
responsible for our beliefs generate stable opposing beliefs and, furthermore, those faculties are 
not recruited to evaluate its soundness. The activity of the faculty that evaluates the soundness of 
the argument from T 1.4.4 can, at most, temporarily dazzle us by slowing our use of our belief-
generating faculties.1 As Hume writes in an endnote of the first Enquiry, we experience 
"momentary amazement and irresolution and confusion" (EHU 12.15).2 Yet, as soon as we leave 
the seminar room or our offices, our beliefs in the mind-independent existence of bodies rush back 
into our consciousnesses. 
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text as 'Treatise' or 'T' followed by either Book, part, and section number, as in this case, or Book, part, section, and 
paragraph number. 
2 References to the first Enquiry are to Hume, An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, ed. Beauchamp, 





 Throughout much of his writings, Hume develops and refines his account of the mind, 
including his account of what beliefs are and how they come to exist. Contrary to many of his 
predecessors, Hume argues that reason or the understanding—the faculty of the mind responsible 
for constructing and evaluating philosophical arguments—does not generate beliefs at all (see T 
1.3.6, and especially 1.3.6.4-12).3 Hume argues that we can come to believe propositions only in 
cases where they express claims suitably related to observed causal regularities (with testimony 
being an important variety of effect) or, as in the case of those impressed upon us by educators, 
where they have repeatedly appeared in the mind (T 1.3.9.16).4 Indeed, regarding the latter, Hume 
reports "I am perswaded, that upon examination we shall find more than one half of those opinions, 
that prevail among mankind, to be owing to education" (T 1.3.9.19). The imagination is the faculty 
at work in both causal and repetitive cases. So, while the set of believable propositions includes 
philosophical claims, we can come to believe them only if they meet these conditions and thus the 
imagination arrives at them. 
 Although Hume supports his account of the mind with arguments and examples, it is not 
until he considers a variety of "sceptical and other systems of philosophy" that he sees himself as 
truly putting it to the test.5 Hume labels these philosophical systems 'sceptical' because their 
constituent arguments have conclusions that cannot be believed (see T 1.4.1.7, 1.4.1.12, 1.4.2.1, 
1.4.2.50, 1.4.2.57, and 1.4.7).6 They do not feature in causal regularities of the sort sufficient to 
generate belief, and repeating them in the mind does not generate belief in them. Hume thinks 
 
3 This is to use 'reason' in Hume's narrow sense which contrasts with the 'imagination.' I will use it in this way in 
what follows. 
4 Hume discusses beliefs of the first variety in, e.g., T 1.3.6.15, 1.3.7.5, 1.3.7.6, 1.3.8.1, 1.3.8.6-11, 1.3.8.15, 1.3.9.8, 
1.3.10.3, 1.4.2.41, 2.3.6.10, App 3, EHU 5.12, and 5.13. Hume discusses beliefs of the second variety at the end of T 
1.3.9. 
5 This quote is part of Hume's title for part 4 of Book 1 of the Treatise. 





there is no better way of putting his account of the mind to the test than by using it to explain our 
lack of belief in the conclusions of these skeptical arguments. 
 Commentators have rightly focused on the reasons why Hume maintains these arguments' 
conclusions are not believed, and on the role these arguments play in Hume's justification of his 
account of the mind. Here is Donald C. Ainslie: 
[…] that part of Hume's goal in his explorations of skepticism in Sections 1 and 2 of Part 
4 [of Book 1 of the Treatise] is to show that only his model of the mind can make sense of 
our experiences in reaction to sceptical challenges. Although there is 'no error' (T 1.4.1.8) 
in these arguments, no one actually believes them. As we shall see, he claims he can explain 
this disbelief as resulting from reflection's 'so disturb[ing] the operation of my natural 
principles' (T Intro.10) as to undermine both the argument and the capacity it challenges. 
We merely create temporary confusion in ourselves, of a kind most vividly described in 
[the] climax [of part 4], when we address our core tendencies to believe. But his 
philosophical opponents have modelled the mind so that we should be able to accept the 
sceptic's conclusions. Our experience with disbelief is evidence against their models.7 
Nevertheless, Hume's interpreters have made a mistake in failing to take seriously the question of 
whether Hume holds that these arguments are demonstrations.8 
 
7 Donald C. Ainslie, Hume's True Scepticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 8. 
8 As far as I can see, no commentator to date has been concerned with whether Hume classifies the arguments as 
demonstrations or not.  In fact, in their descriptions of Hume's arguments, they paraphrase Hume's position in ways 
that obscures the precise character of their interpretations. Janet Broughton writes that "Hume is indeed committed 
to his deeply negative conclusions: they are what he really thinks" ("The Inquiry in Hume's Treatise," The 
Philosophical Review 113:4 (2004): 537-56, 49). Likewise, Phillip D. Cummins describes Hume as thinking that the 
skeptical arguments are "irrefutable" ("Hume's Diffident Skepticism," Hume Studies 25 (1999): 43-65, 50). And 
David Owen describes the conclusions themselves as "results" because Hume takes himself to have proven them in 
some strong sense ("Scepticism with Regard to Reason," in The Cambridge Companion to Hume's Treatise, ed. 
Donald C. Ainslie and Annemarie Butler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015): 101-34, 25). What would 
it be for Hume to "really think" something? It is not clear how irrefutability fits into Hume's system. Hume does not 





This is a mistake for two reasons. First and foremost, if the skeptical arguments that Hume 
presents are not demonstrations because they are invalid and/or because their premises are subject 
to countervailing evidence (or otherwise open to justifiable doubt), then Hume's case for his 
account of the mind is severely weakened, supposing, as I do, that an interpretation like Ainslie's 
is correct. After all, if the skeptical arguments suffer from one or more of these inferiorities, then 
we are left to infer that they are the best explanation of why the mind does not believe the 
conclusions of the arguments—especially if we, like Hume's predecessors, defend an alternative 
account of belief formation.9 Only if the arguments are demonstrations can their existence be the 
decisive evidence Hume takes them to be for his descriptive psychological view about the nature 
of the mind's belief-generating faculties. As Hume asserts, unlike other arguments, demonstrations 
are decisive: 
'Tis not in demonstrations as in probabilities, that difficulties can take place, and one 
argument counter-ballance another, and diminish its authority. A demonstration, if just, 
admits of no opposite difficulty; and if not just, 'tis a mere sophism, and consequently can 
never be a difficulty. 'Tis either irresistible, or has no manner of force. To talk therefore of 
objections and replies, and ballancing of arguments in such a question as this, is to confess, 
either that human reason is nothing but a play of words, or that the person himself, who 
talks so, has not a capacity equal to such subjects. (T 1.2.2.6) 
 Second, if these skeptical arguments are demonstrations, then the import of Hume's 
position increases significantly. From Aquinas to Descartes, predecessors in the Aristotelian 
 
9 "Inferiorities" here should be interpreted to refer to ways in which arguments are worse than others. This is not to 
claim that arguments that are not demonstrations are inferior in the sense that they are no good at all—just that if a 
demonstration could be generated for their conclusions, it would be better. Like intuitions, demonstrations provide 
epistemic certainty, something that neither causal "proofs" nor "probabilities" are capable of. See, e.g., T 1.2.2.6 





tradition maintain that demonstrations necessitate belief in their conclusions.10 If one carries out a 
demonstration, one believes its conclusion. Since Hume's antecedents also argue that many 
important philosophical theses can be demonstrated, Hume's position undermines this 
longstanding picture of the power of philosophy.11 Hume dismisses the view that, in any case, "the 
difference betwixt believing and disbelieving any proposition" is whether it is conceived—an 
honor that the contraries of demonstrable propositions lack in being inconceivable—since for any 
non-demonstrable proposition, both it and its contrary are conceivable (T 1.3.7.3).12 
 So, while many philosophers are familiar with the fact that Hume's skeptical arguments 
play the aforementioned role in his broader project, this fact is consistent with the arguments being 
inductive, abductive, or of some other variety. It is also consistent with the universally-held view 
that Hume maintains that all demonstrations generate knowledge. Yet, as I will argue, Hume holds 
that the argument from T 1.4.4 is as unable to generate knowledge as it is to generate belief.  
Exploring Hume's account of the mind helps us better understand the implications of his 
views about the inability of reason to generate attitudes towards philosophical views. In general, 
the possibility that Hume's arguments are demonstrations and yet have unbelievable and 
unknowable conclusions poses a challenge to philosophers more broadly: what attitude can we and 
should we take towards arguments whose conclusions we cannot accept but whose flaws we cannot 
 
10 For Descartes, see, e.g., AT 7:5-6 and 7:57-58. References to Descartes' works are to Descartes, Oeuvres de 
Descartes, ed. Adam and Tannery, hereafter cited in the text by volume and page number. For Aquinas, see, e.g., 
Summa Theologiae Ia.79.9. This reference is to Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, ed. Freddoso, here cited by part, 
question, and article number. 
11 On the first point, see Descartes' discussion at AT 7:1-3. 
12 This is the one case where Hume seems to indicate that he holds a cognitive—as opposed to sensitive—account of 
belief. My interpretation of this passage is that Hume rejects as unsatisfactory this cognitive, mere conception 
account of belief because it is not generalizable to the case of "reasonings from causation, and concerning matters of 
fact." Furthermore, Hume never mentions it again and it is deeply incongruent with the account developed 





discover? If a position like Hume's is correct, and if ought implies can, then it seems that there 
could be cases where we demonstrate a truth and yet it is not the case that we ought to believe it. 
 In section 2, I will discuss the context of Hume's argument from T 1.4.4 and summarize 
the argument itself. In section 3, I will analyze the argument. In section 4, I will give brief 
background on the history of demonstrations and what Hume retains from his predecessors. Then 
I will argue that Hume's argument from T 1.4.4 is a demonstration of a special variety that has not 
been noted in the literature and that does not generate knowledge. In section 5, I will contextualize 
my reading of Hume's position on knowledge and the argument from T 1.4.4 relative to T 1.4.1 
("Of scepticism with regard to reason") in order to respond to a natural objection to my 
interpretation. 
2. The context of Hume's argument in T 1.4.4 
In T 1.4.4, Hume's targets are the so-called "modern philosophers," hence the title of the section 
("Of the modern philosophy") and Hume's description of the primary/secondary quality distinction 
as the "fundamental principle" of modern philosophy (T 1.4.4.3). Hume initially defines the 
distinction as the view that, "upon the removal of sounds, colours, heat, cold, and other sensible 
qualities, from the rank of continu'd independent existences, we are reduc'd merely to what are 
call'd primary qualities, as the only real ones, of which we have any adequate notion" (T 1.4.4.5). 
Hume tells us that he has many objections to the "system" that supports the distinction but he will 
"confine [himself] to one." Hume asserts that he intends to show with his main argument in T 
1.4.4.6-9 that "if colours, sounds, tastes, and smells be merely perceptions, nothing we can 
conceive is possest of a real, continu'd, and independent existence; not even motion, extension and 





what position Hume takes on the antecedent of this conditional, my focus will be on Hume's 
argument for the conditional itself.13 
 Throughout the Treatise, Hume uses the label "modern philosophers" to refer to those 
philosophers who maintain that (i) mental states called "perceptions" are the only things that are 
immediately present to the mind and that (ii) some things that are represented by the mind are not 
immediately present to the mind.14 A subset of things of the latter variety are those with "continu'd 
and independent existence"; that is, they exist continually while not perceived by a mind, and they 
are located outside of the mind and causally independent from it in "existence and operation" (T 
1.4.2.2). (Going forward, it is the latter of these two features that matters for Hume's argument, so 
I will refer to things with "continu'd and independent existence" as 'mind-independent.') Whether 
these things are material or not, they are represented by the mind in virtue of being represented by 
a perception. Consequently, the modern philosophers are indirect realists. 
 In rough form, Hume's argument against the primary/secondary quality distinction goes as 
follows. First, Hume argues that things that instantiate the primary qualities like extension cannot 
be conceived except as instantiating secondary qualities like color.15 (Much of Hume's efforts go 
 
13 For discussion of whether Hume endorses the antecedent, see Annemarie Butler, "Hume's Causal Reconstruction 
of the Perceptual Relativity Argument in Treatise 1.4.4," Dialogue 48:1 (2009): 77-101, Jani Hakkarainen, "Hume 
on the Distinction between Primary and Secondary Qualities," in Vanishing Matter and the Laws of Motion: 
Descartes and Beyond, ed. Peter Anstey and Dana Jalobeanu (London: Routledge, 2011), 235-59, esp. 40-47, 
Kenneth Winkler, "Hume and the Sensible Qualities," in Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and 
Ongoing Debate, ed. Lawrence Nolan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 239-73, Jani Hakkarainen, "Hume's 
Scepticism and Realism," British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20:2 (2012): 283-309, and Jason R. Fisette, 
"Hume on the Lockean Metaphysics of Secondary Qualities," Hume Studies 40:1 (2014), 95-136, esp. section 2.2.1. 
I agree with Jani Hakkarainen that if Hume does endorse the antecedent and nonetheless maintains that there are 
bodies, then "in that case his metaphysics of body would be nonmaterialist and his philosophy non-Realist in 
general." For discussion, see Hakkarainen, "Hume on the Distinction between Primary and Secondary Qualities," 
236 and throughout. 
14 See, in particular, T 1.4.2. 
15 Note that by 'secondary qualities,' here and throughout I refer to what have been called "proper sensibles" (the 
immediate objects of our senses) and not the powers or dispositions in the bodies that supposedly cause or explain 
proper sensibles. Hume refers to the former with "sensible qualities." I am merely following Hume's terminology 
when I use this terminology—at no point do I intend to refer to powers or dispositions. For discussion, see 





into establishing this controversial premise for each notable primary quality.) Given that defenders 
of the primary/secondary quality distinction hold that only our mental states instantiate the 
secondary qualities and that bodies are constituted by instantiations of the primary qualities, it 
follows that mind-independent bodies cannot be conceived. Mind-independent things are, by 
definition, not mental states. 
 We can see why this argument opposes the position of the modern philosophers, as it 
proceeds from the supposition of one of their views to a denial of their indirect realism. Those 
modern philosophers who defend the primary/secondary quality distinction maintain that our ideas 
of bodies successfully represent mind-independent bodies because they are ideas of the bodies' 
primary qualities. If Hume's argument goes through, they are in major trouble: indeed, we cannot 
represent mind-independent bodies if we cannot even conceive them. If the things that have the 
secondary qualities are merely our mental states, and we cannot conceive things that have the 
primary qualities except as things that have the secondary qualities, then our ideas of bodies could 
not be ideas of mind-independent bodies. At least with respect to bodies, the modern philosophers 
must abandon their realism because none of their ideas succeed in being indirect representations 
of mind-independent bodies. 
3. Hume's argument in T 1.4.4 
Starting in T 1.4.4.6 and ending in 1.4.4.9, Hume's argument proceeds from the assumption of the 
first conjunct of the primary/secondary quality distinction to a claim which entails the negation of 
its second conjunct: 
C. If "colours, sounds, tastes, and smells be merely perceptions" of ours, then "nothing 





Since C is a conditional, Hume must argue for it by arguing that its consequent cannot be false 
while its antecedent is true. Hence, the antecedent of C can be treated as the first premise: 
P1. Suppose that our perceptions of colors, sounds, tastes, and smells could not be ideas of 
mind-independent things. 
 The rest of the argument finds Hume making two sets of moves for each of the three 
paradigmatic primary qualities (motion, extension, and solidity). First, Hume argues that, for each 
of these primary qualities, to conceive it is to conceive both a concrete thing that has it—in itself 
and not in relation to other things—and its relations.16 In the case of solidity, for instance, Hume 
asserts that 
[...] properly speaking, solidity or impenetrability is nothing, but an impossibility of 
annihilation, as has been already observ'd: For which reason 'tis the more necessary for us 
to form some distinct idea of that object, whose annihilation we suppose impossible. An 
impossibility of being annihilated cannot exist, and can never be conceiv'd to exist, by 
itself; but necessarily requires some object or real existence, to which it may belong. (T 
1.4.4.11) 
Second, Hume argues that, for each of these three primary qualities, to conceive a concrete thing 
that has it—in itself and not in relation to other things—is to conceive the secondary qualities of 
that thing. Since defenders of the primary/secondary quality distinction maintain that our 
perceptions of things that have secondary qualities could not be perceptions of mind-independent 
things and that bodies are constituted by primary qualities, it follows that our perceptions of bodies 
 
16 Hume is here tracking the contemporary distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. Roughly, intrinsic 
properties are those that a thing would have regardless of whether any other things exist or not, while extrinsic 





could not be perceptions of mind-independent things. The relevant part of the first set of moves 
can be expressed by the following three premises: 
P2. Our perceptions of motion must be partially constituted by perceptions of moving 
bodies in themselves and not in relation to other things. 
P3. Our perceptions of extension must be partially constituted by perceptions of extended 
bodies in themselves and not in relation to other things. 
P4. Our perceptions of solidity must be partially constituted by perceptions of solid bodies 
in themselves and not in relation to other things. 
 In the passages containing his argument, Hume does not give much in the way of 
justifications for these premises. Regarding Hume's identification of our perceptions of the primary 
qualities with perceptions of concrete things that have these qualities, this lacuna is explicable 
since such an identification is entailed by the nominalism that Hume defends throughout his 
writings. Hume consistently maintains that it is not possible for there to be uninstantiated qualities 
or qualities instantiated in indeterminate ways, whether in thought or not.17 However, it is less 
clear why Hume assumes that a perception of a thing's primary qualities is, in part, a perception of 
that thing in itself and not in relation to other things. Hume's underlying view seems to be that 
even if a primary quality is itself entirely relational, to conceive of a thing that has it requires 
conceiving of that thing as it is in itself, and not merely as it relates to other things. One cannot 
conceive of a rock as contiguous to another without conceiving that there is something the two 
rocks are like in themselves; conceiving only the contiguity of two things is impossible. 
 To make the second set of moves noted above, Hume begins by leveraging to his advantage 
what Locke calls the "visible connexion" between some primary qualities. While Locke's position 
 





is that the primary qualities are the essential qualities of matter—such that it is necessary that every 
body is in motion or at rest, extended, and solid—he does not maintain that this fact is intuitively 
knowable. Bodies do not wear all their primary qualities on their sleeves, as it were. Locke 
maintains that we can know with certainty that a thing b instantiates a primary quality x only if 
either we perceive b to instantiate x via our senses or a quality y that we perceive b to instantiate 
bears a visible connection to x.18 A visible connection is, in turn, a necessary link between the two 
qualities. Some such connections must be demonstrated, but others are immediately perceived (i.e., 
intuitive) such that in virtue of perceiving b instantiating y, we perceive it instantiating x. In the 
case of motion, Hume argues that 
P5. Our perceptions of moving bodies must be partially constituted by either perceptions 
of extended bodies or perceptions of solid bodies. 
 Hume does not give any argument for P5 because he seems to assume that Locke would 
grant that there is an immediately visible connection between motion and either extension or 
solidity. Hume maintains that the fact that there is such a palpable link between these primary 
qualities is self-evident if only one considers one's perceptions of moving bodies. A moving body 
is inconceivable unless it is conceived to be extended or solid; in our thoughts, a moving body just 
is an extended or solid body that undergoes a change in place. 
 Given P2-P4, the role of P5 is to narrow down the range of perceptions of bodies (in 
themselves and not in relation to other things) that could be partial constituents of our perceptions 
of motion to those that are partial constituents of our perceptions of extension and solidity. With 
his next premise, Hume identifies the perceptions which are constituents of some of our 
perceptions of extended bodies: 
 
18 See, e.g., E IV.iii.14. References to the Essay are to Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P.H. 





P6. Our perceptions of extended bodies must be constituted by perceptions of arrays of 
(non-overlapping) simple parts that are either colored points or solid points. 
 Since defenders of the primary/secondary quality distinction maintain that our perceptions 
of things with secondary qualities could not be perceptions of mind-independent things, those 
perceptions of extended bodies that are constituted by perceptions of colored points are not 
perceptions of mind-independent bodies. However, Hume has not arrived at his overall conclusion 
yet, given that P6 also makes room for some perceptions of extended bodies to be constituted by 
perceptions of solid points. This brings us to the first derived premise, which follows from P5 and 
P6: 
C1. If either our perceptions of moving bodies or our perceptions of extended bodies could 
be perceptions of mind-independent bodies, then these perceptions must be partially 
constituted by perceptions of solid bodies and these perceptions of solid bodies must be 
perceptions of mind-independent bodies. 
 Conjoined with P2-P4, C1 entails that only if our perceptions of solid bodies could be 
partially constituted by perceptions of mind-independent bodies in themselves (and not in relation 
to other things) could our perceptions of moving or extended bodies be partially constituted by 
perceptions of mind-independent bodies in themselves (and not in relation to other things). And if 
our perceptions of moving or extended bodies could not be so constituted, then they would fail to 
be perceptions of mind-independent bodies. This is why Hume subsequently asks, "what idea we 
have of these [solid] bodies?" Everything is resting on our ideas of solid bodies. As Hume states, 
"ideas of colours, sounds, and other secondary qualities are excluded. The idea of motion depends 
on that of extension, and the idea of extension on that of solidity" (T 1.4.4.9). Oddly enough, at 





C2. Our perceptions of solid bodies could not be perceptions of mind-independent things. 
C3. Our perceptions of bodies could not be perceptions of mind-independent things. 
 Fortunately, shortly thereafter Hume repeats himself in a way that reveals the assumptions 
underlying his inferences. This is the first paragraph after the main argument from T 1.4.4, which 
is a paragraph in which Hume repeats the argument to "render it more obvious by some variation 
of the expression." Here is what Hume writes, and again he is abrupt: 
Now I ask, what idea do we form of these bodies or objects, to which we suppose solidity 
to belong? To say, that we conceive them merely as solid, is to run on in infinitum. To 
affirm, that we paint them out to ourselves as extended, either resolves all into a false idea, 
or returns in a circle. Extension must necessarily be consider'd either as colour'd, which is 
a false idea; or as solid, which brings us back to the first question. We may make the same 
observation concerning mobility and figure; and upon the whole must conclude, that after 
the exclusion of colours, sounds, heat and cold from the rank of external existences, there 
remains nothing, which can afford us a just and consistent idea of body. (T 1.4.4.10) 
 Since Hume adduces no additional premises to facilitate the inference to C2 from the 
premises before, and P1 and P4 are the only prior premises that could be relevant to explaining 
hiss abruptness, it must be these premises that provide the answers. P2 and P5 concern motion. P3 
and P6 concern extension. If all Hume has asserted is that our perceptions of colors, sounds, tastes, 
and smells could not be perceptions of mind-independent things (P1), that our perceptions of 
solidity must be at least partially constituted by perceptions of solid bodies in themselves and not 
in relation to other things (P4), and that our perceptions of solid bodies could not be perceptions 
of mind-independent things (C2), then he must be assuming that our perceptions of colors, sounds, 





relation to other things. That is, Hume is assuming that the only way that solid bodies could be 
conceived is as having the secondary qualities listed in P1. (And conceiving of solid bodies as 
moving or extended is no help, as these bodies are inconceivable unless we conceive of them as 
having color or "as solid, which brings us back to the first question.") 
 Of course, a natural worry here is that colors, sounds, tastes, and smells do not exhaust the 
available options. Why not think that the perceptions which partially constitute our perceptions of 
solid bodies are those resembling the feelings we get from touching solid bodies? Hume seeks to 
disabuse his readers of this notion in the paragraphs concluding T 1.4.4. This task is all the more 
pressing given that Locke explicitly argues that the solidity of mind-independent bodies is directly 
sensed via touch.19 
 Hume is emphatic that he was not begging the question by assuming the contrary of Locke's 
position on this issue with P1 (as his previous statements of P1 corroborate). And Hume is equally 
emphatic that touch does not provide an escape route for Locke: "tho' bodies are felt by means of 
their solidity, yet the feeling is a quite different thing from the solidity; and that they have not the 
least resemblance to each other" (T 1.4.4.13). Given that Hume argues the feelings caused in us 
by solid bodies do not resemble our perceptions of solid bodies, given that he maintains that we 
cannot form perceptions of solid bodies "without having recourse to the secondary and sensible 
qualities" (T 1.4.4.11) listed in P1, and given that our perceptions of solid bodies could not be even 
partially constituted by perceptions of sounds, tastes, or smells, it seems that Hume's view is that 
P7. Our perceptions of colored points are the only perceptions we could have of solid 
bodies in themselves and not in relation to other things. 
 





 Because the preceding line of reasoning is not self-evident in the premises Hume explicitly 
provides, this suppressed premise ought to be inserted between C1 and C2.20 
4. Hume's argument in T 1.4.4 is an analytical demonstration 
4.1 - Demonstrations, Humean and otherwise 
Before I argue that Hume intends his argument to be a demonstration, some background on 
demonstrations is needed. Aristotle is the progenitor of the concept, and demonstrations hold an 
especially prominent place in the Aristotelian tradition. In Metaphysics Γ 1-3, Aristotle argues that 
philosophy is the most fundamental "science" since it concerns the necessary and universal 
"axioms" of things in general.21 Particular sciences, like biology, concern proper subsets of the 
things. The philosopher's job is to investigate the axioms of "that which is qua thing-that-is" 
("being qua being") and to unfold their consequences in order to achieve the highest sort of 
knowledge.22 Demonstrations just are elaborations of the first principles, and this is why Aristotle 
describes the fruits of distinctively philosophical reasoning as "demonstrative understanding."23 
Aristotle argues that demonstrations themselves are sound syllogistic arguments with necessary 
truths for premises, and he proposes that the premises of demonstrations must be better known 
than, prior to, and asymmetric explanations of their conclusions.24 Aristotle insists that the 
 
20 For a congenial, if abbreviated, reading of Hume’s argument, see Fisette, "Hume on the Lockean Metaphysics of 
Secondary Qualities," 108-112. 
21 Namely, in Metaphysics 1003a20-1005b35. This reference is to Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle: The 
Revised Oxford Translation, ed. Jonathan Barnes, here and hereafter cited by book followed by Bekker lines (or line 
ranges). 
22 The first translation is from Christopher Kirwan (Aristotle, Aristotle: Metaphysics Books Γ, Δ, and E, tr. and ed. 
Christopher Kirwan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993): 1), while the second is from Jonathan Barnes (Aristotle, The 
Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, 1585). 
23 See Book 1 of the Posterior Analytics. 'Demonstrative understanding' is Barnes' translation (1984, The Complete 
Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation, 115 and throughout) 
24 On the first point, see Prior Analytics 24a21-b12 and Posterior Analytics 71b9-24, 73a21-24 and 74b5-17, as well 





philosopher who demonstrates does not merely know that something is the case, but also why it is 
so. 
 Although the concept of demonstration persists in forms faithful to its Aristotelian roots 
through the medieval period, it undergoes a significant transformation in the hands of the early 
moderns. Previously of central importance, the syllogism is nowhere to be found or, worse, 
derided.25 The forms that inferences can take decline in prominence and the focus turns to their 
content. This shift is owed in no small part to the rise of an interest in empirically-driven 
psychology—a shift which leads early modern thinkers like Locke to attempt to locate 
demonstrations in the mind itself. In his Essay, Locke defines demonstration as "where the mind 
[clearly] perceives the agreement or disagreement of any ideas, but not immediately" and 
knowledge as "nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and 
repugnancy, of any of our ideas," thereby collapsing Aristotle's distinction between demonstration 
and demonstrative understanding.26 
 One important consequence of this reconfiguration is that the domain of the demonstrable 
becomes significantly more restricted. As Locke notes, since not everything about our ideas can 
be demonstrated, "the extent of our knowledge comes not only short of the reality of things, but 
even of the extent of our own ideas" (E IV.iii.6). Famously, Locke argues that it is "impossible for 
us, by the contemplation of our own ideas, without revelation, to discover, whether omnipotency 
has not given to some systems of matter fitly disposed a power to perceive and think, or else joined 
and fixed to matter so disposed a thinking immaterial substance" (E IV.iii.6). This pessimism about 
 
25 For the latter, see Descartes' comments in his Rules for the Direction of the Mind, where he claims that syllogistic 
reasoning "contributes nothing whatever to knowledge of the truth, we should realize that, on the basis of their 
method, dialecticians are unable to formulate a syllogism with a true conclusion unless they are already in 
possession of the substance of the conclusion, i.e. unless they have previous knowledge of the very truth deduced in 
the syllogism. It is obvious therefore that they themselves can learn nothing new from such forms of reasoning" (AT 
10.406). 





the demonstrability of mind-body dualism directly contrasts with the optimism of Descartes. 
Referring to the main arguments in his Meditations, Descartes writes to the theology faculty at 
Sorbonne that 
[…] I know that the only reason why many irreligious people are unwilling to believe that 
God exists and that the human mind is distinct from the body is the alleged fact that no one 
has hitherto been able to demonstrate these points. Now I completely disagree with this: I 
think that when properly understood almost all the arguments that have been put forward 
on these issues by the great men have the force of demonstrations […]. (AT 7:3) 
 Hume absorbs the assumptions of Locke at the expense of both Descartes and Aristotle. 
Given that Hume is deeply interested in human nature, and he sees the mind as its primary source, 
he preoccupies himself with giving a comprehensive account of the mind. Consequently, anything, 
demonstrations included, must be understood through its lens. Following Locke, Hume divides 
knowledge acquisition into two kinds: intuition and demonstration.27 For Hume, we can acquire 
demonstrative knowledge when we chain multiple instances of intuitive knowledge to one another 
in order to know something which could not have been known without so doing.28 Like Locke, 
who maintains that intuitive knowledge can be acquired from perceiving two ideas together "at the 
first sight […] without the intervention of any other Idea; [and that] this kind of Knowledge is the 
clearest, and most certain, that humane Frailty is capable of" (E IV.ii.1), Hume holds that intuitive 
knowledge is immediate and direct knowledge of its objects.29 Since Hume maintains that 
knowledge comes in the form of perceptions that are immediately present to the mind (which come 
 
27 See T 1.3.3.1-3 for an important argument of Hume's that relies on intuition and demonstration being the only two 
ways to achieve knowledge. 
28 As Owen (Hume's Reason, 9) puts it, "Two ideas are demonstratively related if the relation between them is 
conceived, not immediately, but via other intermediate ideas. The link between each pair of adjacent ideas in the 
resulting chain must be intuitive." For a concise description of how demonstrations are structured, see Owen, 
Hume's Reason, 93-9. 





in two varieties, impressions and ideas), and if, as it is widely held, he rejects direct realism, Hume 
agrees with Locke that knowledge—and so its acquisition via demonstration—is a mental affair.30  
 Hume holds that "the objects of knowledge and certainty", or the knowable things, are 
relations of a special variety (T 1.3.1.2). These relations, which I will call the 'knowable relations', 
are unique in being dependent only on their relata in themselves and not in relation to other things. 
That is, the nature of the relata of the knowable relations is the sole determinant of whether the 
relations hold or not.31 Here is Hume introducing this criterion in T 1.3.1 ("Of knowledge"): 
These relations may be divided into two classes; into such as depend entirely on the ideas, 
which we compare together, and such as may be chang'd without any change in the ideas. 
'Tis from the idea of a triangle, that we discover the relation of equality, which its three 
angles bear to two right ones; and this relation is invariable, as long as our idea remains the 
same. On the contrary, the relations of contiguity and distance betwixt two objects may be 
chang'd merely by an alteration of their place, without any change on the objects 
themselves or on their ideas; and the place depends on a hundred different accidents, which 
cannot be foreseen by the mind. (T 1.3.1.1) 
As Hume explains in the subsequent paragraphs, he ends up with this criterion because he is a 
knowledge infallibilist: so long as one has in mind two things in themselves and not in relation to 
 
30 For Hume's rejection of direct realism, see T 1.4.2. 
31 Thus, the knowable relations are what are nowadays called 'internal relations'. See Fraser MacBride, "Relations," 
in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward Zalta (Stanford: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford 
University, 2016), for discussion of recent attempts to make this notion precise. Both Graciela De Pierris (Ideas, 
Evidence, and Method: Hume's Skepticism and Naturalism concerning Knowledge and Causation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015), 12, 97-110, and Jani Hakkarainen ("Why Hume Cannot Be A Realist," Journal of Scottish 
Philosophy 10:2 (2012): 143-61) explicitly apply this term to Hume's knowable relations. See also Jonathan Cottrell, 






other things, one cannot err about which knowable relations they bear to one another.32 The rest of 
the world need not cooperate, hence knowledge's immediacy and directness. It is for this reason 
that Hume holds that only those perceptions that have knowable relations as objects can qualify as 
instances of knowledge. 
 Hume also holds that the knowable relations are necessary. This aspect of Hume's position 
stems from his endorsement of the Conceivability Principle, which is the claim that "whatever we 
conceive is possible" (T 1.4.5.10).33 For any two things x and y, and for any relation R which is 
not a knowable relation, Hume argues that if we conceive of x and y in themselves, we do not 
thereby conceive either xRy or ~(xRy). The nature of the two does not determine that we conceive 
of them as so related or not. Given the Conceivability Principle, it follows that it is possible that 
xRy and it is possible that ~(xRy), regardless of how x and y are in themselves and which non-
knowable relation R is. This line of reasoning is one prong of Hume's negative position on the 
necessary connection that holds between causal relata. Having the nature of two billiard balls in 
mind does not require conceiving of them as causally related or not, so it is not necessary that they 
are causally related (for any two billiard balls).34 
 Traditionally, commentators have argued that all the premises of Humean demonstrations 
are knowable relations.35 In the next two subsections, I will argue that Hume holds that some 
demonstrations do not have knowable relations for premises or conclusions, and thus these 
demonstrations cannot generate knowledge. Members of this second kind of demonstration, which 
I will call "analytical demonstrations," and which include Hume's argument in T 1.4.4, consist of 
 
32 For relevant cases where Hume uses 'infallible' and its cognates, see T 1.3.1.5, 1.3.3.2, and 1.4.1.1. For relevant 
cases where Hume uses 'certain' and its cognates, see T 1.3.1.2, 1.3.1.5, 1.3.1.6, 1.3.3.1, 1.3.3.2, 1.3.3.3, 1.3.3.8, 
1.3.6.7, 1.3.6.8, 1.3.12.14, and so on. 
33 See also T 1.1.7.6 and Abs 11. 
34 See, e.g., T 1.3.6.1, 1.3.9.10, 1.3.14.13, and EHU 4.2. 
35 In fact, Owen, the foremost authority, argues that "the relation of proportions in quantity or number [is] the only 





analyses of perceptions, and not in sequences of relations between them. What exactly this 
amounts to will become clear in what follows. 
4.2 - The argument from T 1.4.4 is an analytical demonstration 
Recall the conclusion of Hume's argument: 
C. If "colours, sounds, tastes, and smells be merely perceptions" of ours, then "nothing 
[material] we can conceive is possest of a real, continu'd, and independent existence." 
 If C is the conclusion of a demonstration, then C is a necessary truth, given Hume is 
emphatic that "wherever a demonstration takes place, the contrary is impossible, and implies a 
contradiction" (Abs 11).36 So, is C a necessary truth? Regarding the antecedent of C, Hume states 
that "only one of the reasons commonly produc'd for this opinion" is "satisfactory" and this reason 
comes in the form of an argument from perceptual relativity with contingent premises (T 1.4.4.3).37 
It is likely, then, Hume classifies the antecedent of C as contingent, for otherwise the antecedent 
of C would be demonstrable (or capable of being intuited). Nonetheless, this does not rule out C 
from being a necessary truth. To see why, consider another formulation of C. In accordance with 
my analysis from sections 2 and 3, C can be equivalently expressed as follows: 
C. If our perceptions of colors, sounds, tastes, and smells could not be perceptions of mind-
independent things, then our perceptions of bodies could not be perceptions of mind-
independent things. 
 If Hume holds that the antecedent of C is contingent, then he holds that the consequent is 
contingent as well. After all, as I argued in sections 2 and 3, Hume's argument contends that our 
perceptions of bodies must be perceptions of things with secondary qualities like colors, so the 
 
36 See also T 1.3.7.3, 1.3.9.10, and Abs 4. 
37 For more on this argument, see Butler, "Hume's Causal Reconstruction of the Perceptual Relativity Argument in 





antecedent of C expresses a tautology with the same form as the claim that if not p, then not p.38 
By Hume's lights, it can only be revealed to be a tautology by conceptual analysis, but it is a 
tautology nonetheless. Since all tautologies are necessary, C is necessary. 
 For an analogous case, consider the claim that if all bachelors are shorter than 9 feet, then 
all unmarried men are shorter than 9 feet. While both antecedent and consequent are contingent, 
the conceptual relationship between bachelorhood and being an unmarried man entails that the 
conditional is necessarily true; 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' can be substituted salva veritate. 
Hume intends C to be a necessary truth of the same sort, so even though the antecedent of C is 
contingent, Hume's demonstration is designed to display the consequences of it given a series of 
necessary truths about the conceptual relationships between the features at issue. 
 Next are P2 through P4. As noted in section 3, these premises follow from Hume's 
assumption that a perception of a thing's primary qualities is, in part, a perception of that thing in 
itself and not in relation to other things. If only we reflect on the perceptions that we have of 
motion, extension, and solidity, we will find that they are partially constituted by perceptions of 
the moving, extended, and solid bodies at issue in themselves and not in relation to other things. 
Since Hume implies that this assumption is a conceptual truth, he must intend P2-P4 to be 
necessary as well. Likewise, Hume maintains that there is an immediately visible connection 
between motion and either extension or solidity. In our thoughts, a moving body just is an extended 
or solid body that undergoes a change in place. If Hume is right about this conceptual relationship, 
then P5 expresses a necessary truth.39 
 
38 Or, more accurately, if not p, not q, not r, and not s, then not p, since perceptions of bodies are not, by Hume's 
argument in T 1.4.4, perceptions of things instantiating sounds, tastes, or smells. 
39 Note that the necessity of these claims does not conflict with the inverse of the Conceivability Principle (that 
inconceivability implies impossibility), a view that some attribute to Hume. For instance, it follows from this view, 
P3, and some logical equivalences that it is necessary that it is not the case that there are extended bodies that lack 





 Hume's argument for P6 is illuminating for several reasons. First, it shows why Hume 
classifies P6 as necessary. Second, it consists of a pair of analytical demonstrations, just like 
Hume's overall argument for C, or so I will contend. To establish P6, Hume relies on some of the 
views he argues for earlier in the Treatise. Two of these views can be formed into an argument for 
P6 as follows: 
(a) Our perceptions of extended bodies must be constituted by perceptions of arrays of 
(non-overlapping) parts which do not have any parts of their own. Call these parts 'simple 
parts'. 
(b) Our perceptions of a part of an extended body must be constituted by either a perception 
of a colored point (or multiple such ideas) or a perception of a solid point (or multiple such 
ideas). 
P6. Our perceptions of extended bodies must be constituted by perceptions of arrays of 
(non-overlapping) simple parts that are either colored points or solid points. 
 The conjunction of (a) and (b) entails P6, so Hume assumes P6 in T 1.4.4 because of his 
prior arguments for (a) and (b). When he first introduces it, Hume is explicit that one of the two 
arguments he gives for (a) is a demonstration. However, this demonstration is not a traditional 
non-analytical demonstration, as it—like the other argument for (a)—does not consist of any 
knowable relations. Hume begins by stating that it will be from the mere "consideration of [his] 
clear ideas" that he will establish (a) and any claims that depend on it (Hume's ultimate goal at that 
juncture in the text, in T 1.2.2.2, is to show that no finite thing is infinitely divisible). The central 
idea in question is "the least idea [he] can form of a part of extension," which Hume claims is an 
idea of a simple part (a part that has no further parts). Hume takes his idea of a simple part, 
 
compatible with it being necessary that it is inconceivable (and so impossible) that there are extended bodies that 





multiplies it, and notes that the resultant idea of extension grows proportionately. From this, Hume 
infers that a perception of an extended thing constituted by an infinite quantity of parts could not 
be finite and that a perception of a finite extended thing must be constituted by a finite quantity of 
parts. There are no knowable relations involved in this reflective exercise. Hume simply reflects 
on his ideas in order to analyze the nature of two kinds of perceptions of extension (infinite and 
finite) via the imagined manipulation of his idea of a simple part. 
 Hume is not at all tentative about the demonstrative status of this argument. Four 
paragraphs after it, Hume describes it and the intervening arguments (none of which are traditional 
demonstrations) as follows: 
I doubt not but it will readily be allow'd by the most obstinate defender of the doctrine of 
infinite divisibility, that these arguments are difficulties, and that 'tis impossible to give any 
answer to them which will be perfectly clear and satisfactory. But here we may observe, 
that nothing can be more absurd, than this custom of calling a difficulty what pretends to 
be a demonstration, and endeavouring by that means to elude its force and evidence. (T 
1.2.2.6) 
It seems, then, that we should take Hume seriously that he understands this as a demonstration, 
and we should reject the received view that demonstrations always involve knowable relations. 
The cost of failing to do so is an abandonment of the status of these arguments in T 1.2 that Hume 
takes to be demonstrative and thus unassailable evidence against the "doctrine of infinite 
divisibility." 
Hume's second argument for (a), which is found just prior to the first, is like the first 
argument in that both consist of analyses of ideas of the simple parts of extension. So, it would 





Hume does not explicitly label this argument as a "demonstration," it too is similar in the relevant 
respects to the demonstration of (a). Hume argues for (b) by reflection on his occurrent ideas (T 
1.2.3.15-16). Of the simple parts of ideas of extended bodies, Hume asserts that 
[…] 'tis also necessary we shou'd preserve the idea of their colour or tangibility in order to 
comprehend them by our imagination. There is nothing but the idea of their colour or 
tangibility, which can render them conceivable by the mind. Upon the removal of the ideas 
of these sensible qualities, they are utterly annihilated to the thought or imagination. (T 
1.2.3.15) 
And Hume repeats himself immediately thereafter (note that in both cases "tangible" is another 
word for "solid", and "tangibility" is another word for "solidity"): 
[…] But if the idea of extension really can exist, as we are conscious it does, its parts must 
also exist; and in order to that, must be consider'd as colour'd or tangible. We have therefore 
no idea of space or extension, but when we regard it as an object either of our sight or 
feeling. (T 1.2.3.16) 
 Given that this argument for (b) is an analysis of an idea in the same way that the 
demonstrations for (a) are, and given that Hume deems the latter demonstrations, this argument 
would seem to qualify as a demonstration as well. Since P6 is entailed by these premises, it follows 
that Hume categorizes P6 as a necessary truth. Because C1, C2, and C3 follow from the preceding 
premises, they must be necessary truths as well. 
 Hume's argument from T 1.4.4 has a necessary conclusion and premises, and it is similar 
in the relevant ways to Hume's analytical demonstration of (a). The main argument is more 





then, to interpret Hume as classifying his argument for C and against the primary/secondary quality 
distinction as an analytical demonstration. 
4.3 - No knowable relations in sight 
Nevertheless, there are several reasons to think that none of the premises of Hume's main argument 
in T 1.4.4 is a knowable relation. First, Hume would argue that some of the premises are not 
relations of any variety. P2 through P6 are whole-part relations (or whole-part relations joined by 
logical connectives). While Hume states that qualitative identity is a relation, he denies that 
numerical identity is a relation because he holds that all relations have numerically distinct relata 
(T 1.1.5 and 1.4.2.26). Since a whole is not distinct from its constituent parts, P2 through P6 are 
not relations, so they are not knowable relations. Second, Hume is emphatic that there are only 
four kinds of knowable relations, and none of his premises belongs to one of these four kinds. The 
four kinds are resemblances, quantitative relations, degrees of a quality, and contrarieties.40 P2 
through P6 are not resemblances like the resemblance with respect to greenness between a blade 
of grass and a leaf. They are not quantitative relations like that which three bears to two. They are 
not degrees of a quality like that which scarlet bears to crimson. In being partially constituted by 
either perceptions of extended bodies or perceptions of solid bodies, our perceptions of moving 
bodies are not greater or lesser in any respect than these perceptions. And they are not contrarieties 
because they are not contrastive claims, like the claim that existence and non-existence are 
 
40 See T 1.3.1.1-2. Those who agree that these relations are the objects of Humean knowledge include Kingsley 
Blake Price ("Does Hume's Theory of Knowledge Determine his Ethical Theory?," 427), David Owen ("Locke and 
Hume on Belief, Judgment and Assent," Topoi 22 (2003): 15-28), Kevin Meeker ("Hume on Knowledge, Certainty, 
and Probability: Anticipating the Disintegration of the Analytic/Synthetic Divide?," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 
88 (2007): 226-42, 28), Frederick Schmitt (Hume's Epistemology in the Treatise: A Veritistic Interpretation (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014): 12, 65-66), Graciela De Pierris (Ideas, Evidence, and Method, 97-110), Don Garrett 
(Hume, 42, 51-52, 92), Donald Ainslie (Hume's True Scepticism, 21), and Peter Millican ("Hume's Fork, and his 
Theory of Relations," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research XCV:1 (2017): 3-65, 17-27), among others. For 






contraries (the only contrariety Hume explicitly cites in the Treatise) or the claim that one object 
destroys another and vice versa (the only contrariety Hume explicitly cites in the first Enquiry).41 
It is true that the claims composing the argument in T 1.4.4 have contraries, but this is true of all 
claims whatsoever and it does not follow that the claims are themselves contrarieties. P7 is a claim 
about conceivability, so it does no better at fitting into Hume's fourfold schema. 
 The same goes for the conclusion C. As noted in the prior subsection, it seems that Hume 
categorizes the antecedent of C as contingent. It could not, then, be a knowable relation, and so C 
could not be a logical connective joining knowable relations. As a consequence, C does not meet 
what Hume takes to be the necessary conditions for knowledge, so Hume would deny that C is 
knowable. Hume must hold that C is demonstrable but neither knowable nor believable. 
5. The relation of T 1.4.1 to T 1.4.4 
A natural objection to the preceding interpretation is that it does not take into account the apparent 
fact that Hume rules out demonstrative knowledge—and knowledge in general—in a preceding 
section of Part 4 of Book 1 of the Treatise, namely T 1.4.1 ("Of scepticism with regard to reason").  
In that section, Hume tells us that he has an argument by which it is shown that "all knowledge 
degenerates into probability" (T 1.4.1.1; T 1.4.1.4). If we take Hume at his word, then it looks like 
we do not need to analyze the intricacies of T 1.4.4 to see that the argument therein cannot produce 
knowledge. The path to an anti-Cartesian and anti-Aristotelian position is much more direct. 
While a full interpretation of T 1.4.1 is beyond the purview of this paper, I will give a 
sketch of my response here. The cornerstone of my reading of T 1.4.1 is the claim that Hume's 
concern in that section is not with knowledge as he defines it in T 1.3.1—that is, his concern is not 
 
41 See T 1.1.5.8 and EHU 3.3n6. Note that it is not clear if Hume has the same view on contrariety across these two 






with knowledge in his strict sense. Hume's concern in T 1.4.1 is with knowledge when it takes the 
form of "assurance," which, for him, is a cluster of dispositions that arise after the acquisition of 
knowledge in his strict sense. The mathematician has assurance in the Pythagorean theorem after 
demonstrating it, and this assurance is, among other things, a confidence in it, a willingness to 
assume it in other mathematical reasoning, and so on. 
The reasons to read T 1.4.1 in this way are manifold, but I will focus on two. First, 
throughout T 1.4.1, Hume uses terminology to refer to knowledge—like "assurance," 
"confidence," "security," and "evidence"—that he uses elsewhere in his corpus to refer to the 
dispositions that arise as effects of the acquisition of knowledge in his strict sense. For instance, 
Hume argues elsewhere that "the assurance of a demonstration proceeds always from a comparison 
of ideas, tho' it may continue after the comparison is forgot" (T 1.3.4.3), where a comparison of 
ideas is an idea of a knowable relation, and that "our confidence in the veracity of that faculty [of 
memory] is the greatest imaginable, and equals in many respects the assurance of a demonstration" 
(T 1.3.13.19). The assurance to which Hume refers in these passages could not be a perception of 
a knowable relation (i.e., knowledge in the strict sense), or else it would not be comparable to our 
confidence in our memory, nor would a thinker be able to possess it despite forgetting the relevant 
knowable relations (which would be a contradiction). Likewise, in T 1.4.1, when Hume uses 
"assurance" and other similar terms, he refers to the way in which mathematicians treat 
mathematical truths after proving them or the way in which merchants use linguistic crutches like 
records to develop trust in past calculations. 
Second, the argument Hume gives in T 1.4.1 does not affect knowledge in his strict sense 
and is plausible only under the assumption that it concerns knowledge in this derivative sense. The 





"resolves" into probability and one in 1.4.1.5-12 where Hume examines the foundation of 
probability. In the first phase, Hume asserts that whether you are a mathematician or a merchant, 
you do not "place entire confidence in any truth immediately upon [your] discovery of it, or regard 
it as any thing, but a mere probability" (T 1.4.1.2-3). You review your records, checking your work 
for errors and finding none, thereby gradually increasing your "assurance" in what you remember 
demonstrating. Yet, your assurance never reaches absolute certainty, regardless of how well-
designed your record system is or how experienced and skilled you are. Even in cases where the 
past calculation was "the most simple question, which can be form'd," namely the sum derived 
from the "addition of two single numbers", you cannot have full "security" about it subsequent to 
calculating it (T 1.4.1.3). If you could, then you could have this sort of security in more complex 
cases. 
This argument could not concern knowledge in Hume's strict sense. Such knowledge does 
not persist beyond the time at which it is initially acquired because its existence is dependent on 
the existence of a perception of the relevant knowable relation. Likewise, it is not a form of 
confidence, as it is an occurrent mental object. It is not scalar in any respect, as you either have it 
or you do not. The infallibility and certainty provided by an instance of strict knowledge is 
maximal when it is possessed, and the possession of it does not rely on any higher-order judgment 
about its status. 
The second phase of the argument confirms this reading. There, Hume argues that if "in 
every reasoning [we must] form a new judgment, as a check or controul on our first judgment or 
belief" (T 1.4.1.1) about the reliability of our faculties of judgment, then this second somewhat 
uncertain judgment would lessen our confidence in the object of the first judgment. Since we would 





third judgment would not be certain either, we would further reduce our confidence. But this never 
happens, and we retain confidence in our judgments. For Hume, this shows that belief must be a 
"sensitive" matter rather than a "cogitative" one (T 1.4.1.8), for otherwise we would have no beliefs 
because our infinitely iterative doubts about them would undermine them. In the present context, 
this is relevant because it shows that Hume understands the kind of knowledge discussed in the 
first phase of the argument as continuous with belief, which is a scalar notion (variable due to 
variable vivacity) that has a tight relationship with the sort of assurance that qualifies as knowledge 
in Hume's derivative sense. To return to the quote from Ainslie from section 1, we can see why an 
interpretation like Ainslie's is correct, even if it is missing an account of why Hume holds that 
there is "no error" in arguments like the main one in T 1.4.4. As Hume makes clear in T 1.4.1, his 
broader goal in Part 4 is to provide evidence for his account of the mind (and his account of belief, 
which is its central component). 
6. Conclusion 
Suppose, like Hume, we find no flaws in his skeptical argument from T 1.4.4. According to Hume, 
upon considering it and its conclusion, we are temporarily confused and disconcerted. The subject-
matter is abstruse and the reasoning is complex. Our minds must strain to comprehend the 
procession of ideas involved, and this "straining […] hinders the regular flowing of the passions 
and sentiments" (T 1.4.1.11). We suffer the "momentary amazement and irresolution and 
confusion, which is the result of skepticism" (EHU 12.15). Regardless of our understanding of its 
logic or premises, we do not believe the conclusion or its consequent. On Hume's picture of 
demonstration, this skeptical argument is conceivable but incredible. To make matters worse, we 
do not know the conclusion or its consequent either. What are we to do? What we cannot do, if 





to common sense is undermined by Hume's position. Fortunately, our belief-generating faculties 
soon step in and bring our attention back to those subjects that come more naturally. As Hume 
says, it "is happy, therefore, that nature breaks the force of all sceptical arguments in time, and 
keeps them from having any considerable influence on the understanding" (T 1.4.1.12). 
 The fact that Hume intends the argument to be a demonstration is crucial to the plausibility 
of the prevailing interpretation of its role in his overall project. It needs to be more than incredible 
to justify Hume's account of the mind—it needs to be decisive. Yet, the possibility that Hume is 
right confronts us with deeper questions that challenge us irrespective of our views on the 
particulars of the argument. First, what attitude do we have towards those arguments that we think 
are sound but whose conclusions we cannot bring ourselves to believe? Perhaps Hume is wrong 
that we cannot know in such cases. If so, does this mean that many of us are wrong in thinking that 
knowledge entails belief? It may be that our beliefs only serve more basic purposes, like guiding 
us as we travel to work or helping us to avoid dangerous animals, but we can nonetheless achieve 
knowledge about abstruse philosophical claims. 
 Second, and more importantly, should we modify our views on the role of philosophy? If 
philosophical argumentation does not provide an independent path to true beliefs, then it seems 
that its position in our epistemic lives should be re-evaluated. The faculty of reason may lack 
sovereignty. In some cases, it might be that we ought to recruit the other faculties in trying to 
convince our peers and our students of philosophical views. In other cases, none of our faculties 
can make us believe what we have demonstrated. Either way, we may need to abandon some of 
philosophy's ambitions. Indeed, this seems to be Hume's conclusion when he muses that "[w]here 
reason is lively, and mixes itself with some propensity, it ought to be assented to. Where it does 
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